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Abstract
This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational con-
tracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We
present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians
play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional
political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the
form of pension beneﬁts and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered
in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On one hand, social
security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in educa-
tion creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital
driving the economy toward dierent Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting
setup of electoral competition, we ﬁnd that in a dynamic ecient economy both forward
and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation
is education ecient,b u t ,d u et op o l i t i c a lo v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o no fe l d e r l ya g e n t s ,t h ee l e c t o r a l
competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution
with balanced welfare weights.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C61, D71, E62, H11
Keywords: aging, Benevolent Government allocation, intergenerational redistribution,
Markovian equilibria, repeated voting.
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1“Why should I care about future generations? What have they done for me?"
(Groucho Marx)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The implementation and the sustainability of intergenerational redistributive programs are cru-
cial issues in the current political debate. On the one hand, demographic changes alter the
economic nature underlying the enforcement of redistributive welfare programs; on the other
hand public policies can be manipulated for political purposes, turning out to be more re-
sponsive to political pressures than to changes in economic environment. For this reasons, it
becomes critical to explore the conditions under which intergenerational transfers, as outcome
of a political voting game, can be implemented and why the welfare system developed so far
has became a stable institution of modern society.
In most developed democracies the political balance between dierent age-cohorts has shifted
in favor of the elderly. Between 1975 and 1990, the average OECD age of median voter has
increased three times faster than in the previous 30 years (OECD, 2007).O n eo ft h em a i ni m p l i -
cations of this trend is that the conﬂicts over the public resources allocation arise not only on the
economic characteristics and political aliation but also on the evolution of socio-demographic
aspects. Starting from this stylized fact, we focus on the dierence in age as the relevant source
of heterogeneity to analyze the implementation of intergenerational redistributive programs in
democratic societies. The conﬂicts between age-classes arise not only because of dierent life-
time span but also for the dierence in ownership of productive factors as well as in sources
of income. While elderly are mainly endowed with physical capital, working-age adults own
human capital accumulated when young. As a consequence, the conﬂict between age-classes is
likely to arise on a broad set of ﬁscal instruments generating dierent conﬁgurations of welfare
programs in which economic and political factors may interact as complement or substitute.
Given the special focus of our analyses on the age-class heterogeneity and the inter-classes
political conﬂicts, among all the redistributive programs, we point out the relevant role played
by two critical age-target policies: public higher education spending and PAYG social security.
These intergenerational redistributive programs, strongly interrelated each other, have deep re-
distributive impact and have recently even more experienced strong political support in modern
democracies. Following the terminology adopted by Rangel (2003),w er e f e rt op u b l i ch i g h e r
education spending as forward (i.e. productive) intergenerational transfers and to unfunded
pension as backward (i.e. pork barrel and log-rolling) intergenerational transfers. The former
are transfers going forward in time generating a cost for the present generation and a beneﬁt for
the future one, being crucial for future productive capacity through human capital production.
By contrast, the latter are transfers going backward generating a cost for the present generation
and a beneﬁt for the past one, giving adults a claim on the future productivity of their young.
This dierent timing of exchange generates dierent incentive problems. Furthermore, the aging
of population plays a relevant role in stressing even more the timing of the intergenerational
2bargaining from both a demographic and a political point of view. On one hand, demographic
aging has a direct economic impact on the ﬁnancial solvency of the public system, since the
fraction of recipients — the retirees — tends to increase, while the share of contributors - the
workers - tends to decrease. On the other hand, the political ideology inﬂuence of the elderly
age-class in the electoral competition process (i.e. political aging) has an indirect economic im-
pact through the electoral vote. As the population ages, so do the voters. In democratic society
population aging leads to an increase in the political representation of the elderly agents, who
gather a larger share of voters1.A s p o l i t i c i a n s s e e k r e - e l e c t i o n , t h e y w i l l t r y t o a d d r e s s t h e
needs of the crucial voting group - the old - with generous social security policies.
Empirical motivation relies on recognizing that since the Second World War the developed
countries have experienced dynamically ecient growth path, i.e. the economic growth rate falls
below the interest rate (Abel et al., 1989).U n d e rs u c he c o n o m i cs c e n a r i o ,e x a c e r b a t e db yt h e
recent demographic transition, there would be no elements in the previous literature to justify
the implementation of PAYG social security programs2, which would depress savings further
and, consequently, intertemporal consumption and, in turns, economic growth. Furthermore,
even in the case of dynamic ineciency scenario, a PAYG social security scheme is a dynamically
inconsistent agreement between successive generations. Adult generations would be better o
discontinuing the PAYG scheme and setting up a new one. However, quite surprising, the share
of per-capita GDP used to ﬁnance higher education and social security following retributive
schemes remains substantial3.F o r t h i s r e a s o n s , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f u n f u n d e d p e n s i o n s c h e m e s
seems puzzling. Hence the question arises of why PAYG schemes survive.
Departing from previous literature, we support the existence of pension system also in
an economy experiencing dynamically ecient path, conditionally on the existence of public
investment in human capital. The following idea is defended: selﬁsh adults buy insurance for
their future old age by paying productive education transfers to their children to raise the labor
productivity of the next period. When old they partially grab the bigger output in the form of
PAYG transfers by exerting political power in a probabilistic voting environment. Obviously
the redistributive scheme works only if the cost of providing a productive transfer is low with
respect to the value of receiving a pork-barrel transfer when old. Therefore, if a PAYG pension
scheme is introduced4,i t sf u t u r eb e n e ﬁ c i a r i e sm a yb e c o m es u p p o r t i v eo fh i g h e rf u n d i n gi n
1The political inﬂuence of the old is magniﬁed by their homogenous preferences over economic policies. Ac-
cording to Mulligan and Xala-i-Martin (1999) old agents are single-minded.
2There are many explanations in the literature on why pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security has been intro-
duced and then expanded (see Galasso and Profeta, 2002).T h e c l a s s i c a l s o l u t i o n o n t h e p u z z l e i s t h a t , i f t h e
economy is on dynamically inecient path, then the introduction of a PAYG social security system is Pareto
improving since it reduces the capital deepening. Among others, see Azariadis and Galasso (2002).
3OECD data show how public tertiary education and social security transfers become increasingly important
and strategic among the main components of public expenditure in modern welfare countries. Focusing on
European Union members, in 2007 public expenditures on higher education took on average of 1.46 percent of
GDP (OECD, 2008) and pension transfers were on average 7.8 percent of GDP (OECD, 2008).
4PAYG pension schemes in which pensions are ﬁnanced by contributions from current workers have often
been criticized as detrimental to growth. According to Feldstein (1974) such pension schemes have a negative
eect on capital accumulation since they discourage private saving and, unlike in the case of a funded pension
system, the payments into the PAYG scheme do not contribute to the national saving. Moreover, the implicit
rate of return on contributions to a PAYG scheme typically falls short of the interest rate. Therefore according to
3public education via taxes. In other words, the existence of a retributive social security system
gives incentives to invest optimally in human capital and, as a consequence, it becomes growth
enhancing for the economic system. Thus, the two age-speciﬁc redistributive programs may
self-sustain reaching optimality.
The aim of this article is to provide a tractable dynamic politico-economic theory to an-
alyze how intergenerational conﬂicts aect, through the political mechanisms in the form of
democratic vote, the size and composition of public expenditure in a context of population
aging. Focusing on target-speciﬁc transfers, our main objective concerns the determination of
the economic and institutional conditions which may induce the emergence of a decentralized
implicit intergenerational contract based on side payments in the form of PAYG and public
education transfers. The economy we study is characterized by overlapping generations living
three periods: Young, Adult and Old. Besides their private consumption, both adults and old
value the public transfers; the presence of a political system is justiﬁed by the need to ﬁnance
the provision of the public spending under credit market constraint. In our environment there
are two types of selﬁsh agents: the private players choose their individual saving and vote for
their political representatives and the elected "public player" decides on public policies. The
electoral competition takes place in a majoritarian probabilistic environment, where political
representatives compete proposing multidimensional ﬁscal platforms, concerning both the in-
come tax level and the provision of intergenerational transfers in the beneﬁt formula, subject to
intra-period balanced budget. We assume away the provision of public goods - a key element in
the political economy of ﬁscal policy5 -i no r d e rt ob r i n go u tm o r ec l e a r l yt h ei m p a c to fp o l i t i c a l
institutions on intergenerational transfers.
Technically, this paper highlights two main features concerning ﬁscal policies. First, several
political choices have to be set at the same time, so the political space cannot be reduced to
am e r eu n i d i m e n s i o n a lp r o b l e m . S e c o n d ,p o l i t i c a ld e c i s i o n sa n dp r i v a t ei n t e r t e m p o r a lc h o i c e s
are mutually aected over time, then selﬁsh perfect forward-looking agents will internalize how
current political choices will inﬂuence the evolution of the economy and the implementation of
future policies.
The focal point of this paper is the characterization of public policies in a multidimensional
dynamic political setting. Following Maskin and Tirole (2001),w ee m b o d yt h e" minor causes
should have minor eect"p r i n c i p l et oi m p l e m e n td i  e r e n t i a b l eS t a t i o n a r yM a r k o vs u b g a m e
Perfect Equilibria (SMPE), where the size of income tax rate and the amount of intergenera-
tional transfers are conditioned on the two payo-relevant asset variables: physical and human
capital. We determine the policy rules as equilibrium outcome in a ﬁnite horizon environment
when the time goes to inﬁnity. As a result we are able to overcome the main limit of the pre-
vious literature related to the adoption of trigger strategies equilibria, which are not robust to
such analysis, PAYG pension systems reduce per capita income. This standard argument is focused on physical
capital accumulation and fails to take notice of the eect of PAYG pension systems have on the accumulation of
human capital, particularly through public education. Primary and secondary education is now overwhelmingly
publicly ﬁnanced in all OECD countries, and universities also receive substantial funding from public sources.
5This issue is yet well investigated by Tabellini (1991), Lizzeri and Persico (2001),H a s s l e re ta l .(2005) and
Bassetto (2008).
4such reﬁnement. We ﬁnally compare the political equilibrium outcome with the inﬁnite horizon
Benevolent Government (Gvt) solution in order to point out normative predictions.
Ruling out commitment devices and reputation mechanisms, we reach the following results:
1) the dynamic eciency condition is the necessary requirement for the simultaneous existence
of public education and PAYG programs; 2) the equilibrium political decisions are education
ecient, while due to politicians’ opportunistic behavior, strategic persistency underlies the
determination of the income tax rate; 3) three dierent Welfare State Regimes (WSR) arise
depending on institutional variables, i.e. the adults and old relative bargaining power, and on
economic variables, i.e. the endogenous level of physical capital; 4) demographic aging increases
the equilibrium per-capita level in public education spending and depending on the WSR has
an ambiguous eect on the size of government; 5) political competition induces overtaxation
and consequently more generous pension beneﬁts compared with the Gvt solution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. In section 3 we present the
model characterizing the economic and political environment. Section 4 describes the politico-
economic equilibrium in the perfect forward-looking scenario. We provide a complete charac-
terization of both the transition dynamics and the long run economy. In section 5 we discuss
the main politico-economic results. Section 6 introduces the Gvt problem without commitment,
comparing the results with the decentralized one. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are contained
in the Appendix.
2L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w
This paper relies on the dynamic political economy literature that incorporates forward-looking
decision makers in a multidimensional policy space. In particular it supports and gives new the-
oretic fundamentals to the existing literature on social security sustainability, which recognizes
the link between productive and redistributive public spending. Among the existing theoret-
ical contributions, from a pure economic point of view Boldrin and Montes (2005) formalize
public education and PAYG system as two parts of an intergenerational contract where public
pension is the return on the investment into the human capital of the next generation. The
authors show how an interconnected pension and public education system can replicate the al-
location achieved by complete market. Allowing issue-by-issue voting, Rangel (2003) studies in
at h r e e - p e r i o dO L Gm o d e lt h ea b i l i t yo fn o n - m a r k e ti n s t i t u t i o n st oo p t i m a l l yi n v e s ti n" f o r w a r d
intergenerational goods" and "backward intergenerational goods". Bellettini and Berti Ceroni
(1999) incorporate politics in an OLG model to analyze how societies might sustain public in-
vestments (e.g. education) even if the interests of those beneﬁtting from the investment are not
represented in the political process. Restricting voting to a binary choice of tax rate and edu-
cation, the authors study whether a given system can be maintained but do not determine the
level of investments in education or social security. As main shortcoming the previous studies
have assumed voters play trigger strategies. Although trigger strategies may be analytical con-
venient, they lead to multiplicity of equilibria. Furthermore, they require coordination among
agents and costly enforcement of a punishment technology which may not work when agents
5are not patient enough. Finally, they are not robust to reﬁnement such as backward induction
in a ﬁnite horizon economy when time tends to inﬁnity. Unlike the previous literature, rather
than emphasizing complementarity between education and pension payments purely sustained
because of reputation mechanisms, our model adopts a dierent perspective. It focuses on the
resolution of the intergenerational conﬂicts over the determination of the amount of the two
public spending components by adopting Markovian strategies.
Many recent studies have identiﬁed the public good provision as the critical variable that
allows the emergence of an intergenerational redistributive scheme. Bassetto (2008) studies how
intergenerational conﬂicts shape government policies when taxes, transfers and public good are
jointly determined. Without public good provision the government would be running a pure
redistribution scheme, to which any household that is a net loser would object: hence, the only
possible equilibrium would entail no taxes and no transfers. In a simpler underlying economic
environment of majority voting Hassler et al. (2007) develop an OLG model of welfare state
where tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public goods and age-dependent transfers. Studying a
linear quadratic economy, they provide analytical solution but the voting strategies equilibrium
turns out to be either constant or independent of fundamentals. Unlike these models we exclude
public good provision. As a dierent device to bring out incentives to pay tax we allow for
productive and long-lasting impact transfers to the future generation of workers. The dynamic
intertemporal linkage occurs by aecting the expected beneﬁts of adults, which when old grab
future output by exerting political power in a probabilistic voting environment.
Finally, there are some studies that analyze the interaction between education and social
security by adopting an altruistic motive. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) study a model where
altruistically-motivated parents invest in the human capital of their children. When parents
retire, the labor income of their children is taxed to ﬁnance their social security beneﬁts. The link
between the human capital of children and the parents’ retirement beneﬁts is disregarded in each
parental educational decision, but it is captured by the government’s social optimization. They
ﬁnd that for some parameter values the optimal policy entails not only subsidizing education
but also to tax labor income to ﬁnance retirement beneﬁts. In Ehrlich and Lui (1998) children
provide support to parents in old age, so that parents have an interest in the education of their
children over and above any altruistic motives. Despite the usefulness of these studies, they
adopt a centralized point of view to justify the simultaneous investment in both redistributive
programs. Dierently from these studies we incorporate the voting institution to implement the
intergenerational contract.
3T h e M o d e l
Consider a discrete-time OLG economy populated by an inﬁnite number of overlapping gener-
ations of ideologically heterogeneous agents, living up to three-periods: Young, Adult and Old.
Every agent born at time t survives with probability one until old age. Population grows at a
constant rate n>1,t h u st h em a s so fag e n e r a t i o nb o r na tt i m e and living at time t is equal
to N
t = N0 (1 + n)
.
63.1 Households
Agents born at time t  1 evaluate consumption according to the following intertemporal non
altruistic utility function:
Ut1 = u(c1,t)+u(c2,t+1) (1)
where   (0,1) is the individual discount rate. c1,t represents the consumption at time t
when adult and c2,t+1 is the consumption at time t +1when old. In the ﬁrst period of life
(i.e. childhood), the individual doesn’t consume. The function u(·) is concave, twice contin-
uously dierentiable and satisﬁes the usual Inada condition, i.e. lim
ct0
uc (ct)=+ .L e t u s
assume preferences exhibit logarithmic form, i.e. u(·) = log(·).
When young, agents spend all their time endowment in acquiring skills if education transfers,
et, are publicly provided without having access to private credit markets6.W h e n a d u l t , t h e
individuals work and consume their labor income, wt,n e to ft h ep r o p o r t i o n a ll a b o ri n c o m e
taxes, t,a n di n d i v i d u a ls a v i n g s ,st, while when old, the individuals retire and consume their
total income, equal to the sum of pension beneﬁts that their children pass to them in the form
of PAYG transfers, pt,a n dt h ec a p i t a l i z e ds a v i n g sa taﬁ x e dg r o s sr e n t a lp r i c eR. Then, the
individual budget constrains for adults and old, respectively, are as follows:
c1,t  C1,t (t,w t,s t)  wt (1  t)  st (2)
c2,t+1  C2,t+1 (pt+1,s t)  Rst + pt+1 (3)
The net present value at time t of the lifetime wealth of an agent born at time t1 is given by:





At each time t the homogenous private good, Yt,i sp r o d u c e db yal i n e a rt e c h n o l o g yt h a tu s e s
labor, Lt,s u p p l i e db yt h ea d u l t sa n dp h y s i c a lc a p i t a l ,Kt, supplied by the old. The linearity
of the production function can be derived as an equilibrium outcome in a context of perfect
international capital mobility and factor price equalization in the presence of goods trade.
Furthermore, it emphasizes the intergenerational conﬂicts due to divergent economic interests
between the two productive classes: workers (adults) and capitalists (old). Then, the production
function at time t is given by:
Yt = wtLt + RKt (5)
6For a recent discussion on the economic reasons of missing credit markets ﬁnancing education, see Kehoe
and Levine (2000).
7where the wage rate, wt =  (1 + ht),a n dt h eg r o s sr e n t a lp r i c et oc a p i t a l ,R,a r ed e t e r m i n e d
by the marginal productivity condition for factor price. At any time t,e a c ha d u l ts u p p l i e s
inelastically one unit of labor, Lt = Nt1
t , with productivity equal to  augmented by the level
of human capital acquired the period before, ht.W i t h o u tl o s so fg e n e r a l i t yw en o r m a l i z e =1 .
The human capital of a member of generation t in his working age, ht+1,i sa ni n c r e a s i n g
function of the government real expenditure on education and the parental education7.P u b l i c
education transfer is supplied in an egalitarian way, consequently, to each individual is given
the same level of it. The following Cobb-Douglas human capital technology is adopted:
ht+1 =






where   (0,1). ht is the dynasty’s human capital at time t and ¯ h is the constant society
endowment of human capital.
Physical capital fully depreciates each period. Consequently, the level of saving determines
the dynamics of per-capita physical capital accumulation. The capital market clears when:
(1 + n)kt+1 = st (7)
3.3 Fiscal Constitution
In order to provide the intergenerational transfers, the agents in the economy have to devised
a politician. In each period, the politician raises revenues through labor income taxes and uses
the proceeds to purchase consumption good to pay transfers to the young and old generation.
We assume for simplicity that the politician is prevented from borrowing: the public balance
must hold in every period. This implies that in each period total beneﬁts paid to old and young
equalize total contributions collected from working generations. Expliciting t the balanced





Ceteris paribus,t h em o r et h ep o p u l a t i o na g e s ,t h eh i g h e rt h ea g g r e g a t ep e n s i o nb e n e ﬁ t sf o r
old agents are and the lower the aggregate education transfers for young people are.
The condition above allows us to reduce the multidimensionality of political platform, ft 
(et,t,p(et,t)).L e t ˆ et be the maximum feasible value of education transfer at each time t.
Then, the balanced budget constraint implies t  (0,1) and et  (0, ˆ et) at each time t.
3.4 Political System
The previous subsection describes the instruments that are available to the politician. We
report here how people interact to chose a particular policy. Public policies are chosen through
7The importance and the empirical relevance of both the public spending in schooling inputs and the parental
education input in the formation of the human capital of the young people has been explored theoretically as
well as empirically. For a comprehensive survey of the related literature see Becker and Tomes (1986).
8repeated voting system according to a majoritarian rule without commitment where elections
take place at the beginning of each period. Young have no political power8.T o d e s c r i b e t h e
politicians’ behavior we consider a probabilistic voting setting9.S u p p o s et h e r ea r et w op a r t i e s ,
l { A,B}, which compete to detain political power, with no ability to extract individual rent
from election. As a consequence their objective is simply the maximization of the probability
of winning elections at each time in order to implement the proposed policy, ft, with no ability
to commit to future one. The electorate is heterogeneous in its own political ideology. Then,





i is a random variable extracted from the distribution function Gi and it represents
the ideological bias towards party B.
The timing of the political bargaining game played at the beginning of each period is then
characterized by the following three steps:
i. each party proposes a political platform, fl
t, in order to maximize its probability of winning
the election;
ii. the ideological bias is realized among voters;
iii. fully rational and forward-looking voters take their voting choice.
At each time, ﬁrst each party proposes the political platforms, second individual j from




















i,t (·) is the individual indirect utility function. Then, given the equilibrium policy
choice of party B, fB








































8We replicate the stylized facts that young people show a much lower turnout rate at elections with respect
to adults and old. As Galasso and Profeta (2004) report in some countries elderly people have a higher rate at
elections than the young. In the U.S. turnout rates among those aged 60-69 years in twice as high as among the
young (19  29 years).A g a i ni nF r a n c ei ti sa l m o s t50%h i g h e r .
9Due to the multidimensionality of the political platform Condorcet winner generally fails to exist. Conse-
quently the median voter theorem doesn’t hold (Plot, 1967).I n t h e l i t e r a t u r e t h e r e a r e t h r e e m a i n i n ﬂ u e n t i a l
approaches for making predictions when the policy space is multi-dimensional. The ﬁrst is the implementation of
structure-induced equilibria. By following Shepsle (1979),a g e n t sv o t es i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,y e ts e p a r a t e l y(i.e. issue
by issue),o nt h ei s s u e sa ts t a k e .V o t e sa r et h e na g g r e g a t e do v e re a c hi s s u eb yt h em e d i a nv o t e r .S e eC o n d e z - R u i z
and Galsso (2005) for a more detailed discussion of this approach. The second is the legislative bargaining ap-
proach, which stems from the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and develops from Battaglini and Coate
(2006).T h i sa p p r o a c ha p p l i e sw h e nl e g i s l a t o r s ’ﬁ r s tl o y a l t yi st ot h e i rc o n s t i t u e n t sa n dl e g i s l a t i v ec o a l i t i o n sa r e
ﬂuid across time and issues. The last approach, which will be exploited in this paper, concerns the adoption of
probabilistic voting rule. While it dates back to the 1970s, its resurgence in popularity stems from Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987). It applies to political environments where party discipline is strong and the winning political
party simply implements its platform. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey of this framework.
9where (·) is a continuos convex correspondence. By symmetry party B solves an equivalent
problem. In the Nash equilibrium of the electoral competition game both candidates proposed
the some policy platform, implementing the utilitarian optimum with respect to current voters.
Summarizing, individual electoral choices depend on the proposed ﬁscal platform, on the impact
of political program on agent’s private behavior, and on ideology.
3.5 Timing
Within each period t, the timing of moves is as follows:
i. a new generation of young people is born;
ii. political bargaining takes place to select the policy to be implemented in period t,a s
described in the previous subsection;
iii. the ﬁrms hire works and rent capital;
iv. the adults receive the proceeds from labor, pay taxes and consume; the old receive the
capitalized saving and transfer and consume; the young receive productive transfers;
v. the old generation dies; the young and adult generation age and become adult and old in
the next period, respectively.
4M a x i m i z a t i o n a n d E q u i l i b r i u m
As in Krusell et al. (1997),w ed e s c r i b et h ee q u i l i b r i u mo fo u re c o n o m ya sad y n a m i cp o l i t i c o -
economic equilibrium. Due to the sequential nature of the timing of the game and solving back-
ward, ﬁrst, the agents determine the optimal level of saving given the ﬁscal stance (Competitive
Economic Equilibrium) and, second, short-lived oce-seeking-politicians determine both the
level of taxation and the amount of backward and forward transfer in order to maximize the
probability of winning elections (Politico-Economic Equilibrium).
4.1 Competitive Economic Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, each adults chooses their lifetime consumption taking ﬁscal and
redistributive policies as given. Maximizing Eq. (1) subject to the individual budget constraints
(2) and (3),a n df e a s i b i l i t yc o n s t r a i n t sc1,t > 0 and c2,t+1 > 0, the following ﬁrst order condition
for interior solutions must hold:
0= (·)  uc1,t (C1,t (·))  Ruc2,t+1 (C2,t+1 (·)) (10)
In equilibrium by implicit function theorem there exists a unique saving function, st =
K ((1 + ht)(1 t),p(et+1,t+1)), which satisﬁes the condition (10).U n d e rE q .(7),t h ee q u i -
librium choices at time t of an adult agent born at time t  1 are given by:
10(1 + n)kt+1 = K ((1 + ht)(1 t),p(et+1,t+1)) (11)
c1,t = C1,t (t,h t,k t+1) (12)
c2,t+1 = C2,t+1 (p(et+1,t+1),k t+1) (13)
Given any separable additive intertemporal utility, Eq. (11),i nt e r m so fl i f e - c y c l ea f t e rt a xe n -
dowment, emphasizes the income and substitution eects due to a variation of the implemented
policies on the individual saving choice.
Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive Economic Equilibrium) Given the initial conditions (h0,k 0)
and the sequence of policies {ft}

t=0, a Competitive Economic Equilibrium is deﬁned as a se-
quence of allocations {c1,t,c 2,t+1,h t+1,k t+1}

t=0 such that individual choices, Eq. (12) and Eq.
(13), are consistent with the law of motion of the economy described in Eq. (6) and Eq. (11),
and markets clear at any point in time.
At time t the indirect utility, W1,t (·),o fa na d u l tb o r nat i m et  1,i st h e ne q u a lt o :
W1,t  max
st
{Ut1 | It} = u(C1,t (·)) + u(C2,t+1 (·)) (14)
For an old individual born a time t  2 the indirect utility, W2,t (·), at time t is as follows:
W2,t  u(C2,t (·)) (15)
We call autarky indirect utility, Wa
1,t,t h el i f e t i m eu t i l i t yo fa na d u l tb o r na tt i m et1, when




{Ut1 | It =1 } (16)
Suppose there is no government that has the authority to levy taxes. As consequence, adults
keep the entirety of their labor income to purchase ﬁnal good and to save. Capital earns a gross
return of R, used by old to buy consumption goods. Clearly, the economy converges to the








and wa =1 .
Deﬁnition 2 (Feasible Allocation) A feasible allocation is a sequence of individual choices
{c1,t,c 2,t+1,h t+1,k t+1}

t=0 and policies {ft}

t=0 that satisﬁes the implementability constraint, Eq.
(11), the balanced budget constraint, Eq. (8), and the ﬁscal feasibility conditions t  (0,1) and
et  (0, ˆ et) at each time t.
4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In this section we consider a government of politically-motivated but short-lived representatives
that have the authority to levy labor income tax and to transfer income across generations. We
11have already described how the political process takes place in each period. To characterize the
politico-economic equilibrium, we need to consider the dynamic aspects of the political process
that takes place in the economy.
As in Krusell et al. (1997),w er e s t r i c tt h en o t i o no fp o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i ce q u i l i b r i u mt ot h e
dierentiable political SMPE concept as equilibrium reﬁnement of subgame perfect equilibria10.
The payo-relevant state variables of our economy are the assets holding by adults and old. i.e.
human capital and physical capital that were determined in the previous period but which go
into eect in the current one11.
At each time voting over a political platform generates dynamic linkages of policies across
periods. The standard logic of competitive models, where agents optimize taking future equi-
librium outcome as given breaks down when political choices are considered. Due to the non-
negligible impact of current political actions on future equilibria, rational agents internalize these
dynamic feedbacks. In our framework dynamic linkages generated by physical and human cap-
ital arises both directly, aecting asset accumulation decision (direct dynamic feedbacks),a n d
indirectly, aecting future political choices (indirect dynamic feedbacks).F o c u s i n g o n M a r k o v
strategies, in which the players’ actions depend on the level of the fundamental state variables
only, agents are able to fully internalize the overall direct and indirect impact of taxation and
redistribution through the evolution of assets.
In a perfect forward-looking environment, in which parties play Markov strategies, the fol-
lowing deﬁnition of equilibrium is adopted:
Deﬁnition 3 (Politico-Economic Equilibrium) A perfect foresight politico-economic SMPE





t=0, such that the functional vector of dierentiable policy decision rules,  =( T,E),
where T : R  R  (0,1) and E : R  R  (0, ˆ et) are respectively the taxation policy rule,
 t = T (ht,k t), and public higher education policy rule, et = E (ht,k t), satisﬁes the following
points:
i. Each party solves the maximization program (9) subject to the following set of constraints:
kt+1 = K (ft,(ht+1,k t+1),h t)
ht+1 = H (et,h t)
where H (·) and K (·) are deﬁned in Eq. (6) and Eq. (11).
10The Markov-perfect concept implies that outcomes are history-dependent only in the fundamental state
variables. The stationary part is introduced to focus only on the current value of the payo relevant state
variable. Consequently the vector of equilibrium policy decision rules is not indexed by time, i.e. the structural
relation among payo-relevant state variables and political controls is not time variant. The dierentiable part is
ac o n v e n i e n tr e q u i r e m e n tt oa v o i dm u l t i p l i c i t yo fe q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m e sa n di no r d e rt og i v ec l e a rp o s i t i v ep o l i t i c a l
predictions.
11The Markov restriction rules out equilibria in which the political outcome depends directly on the past
outcomes, as in "reputation" equilibria. This results to be plausible in our environment, where periods are very
long and bargaining takes place among dierent agents at each point in time.
12ii. The ﬁxed point condition holds, i.e. the policies are ﬁxed points of the mappings E into
Eex (ht,k t) and T into Tex (ht,k t), where the apex ex stand for expected.
The ﬁrst equilibrium condition requires the political control variables, ft, have to be chosen in
order to maximize the party’s objective function, taking into account that future redistribution
and taxation depend on the current policy choices via both the equilibrium private decisions and
future equilibrium policy rules. The second condition requires that, if the equilibrium exists,
it must satisfy the ﬁxed point requirement. From a technical point of view, we are looking
for two dierentiable policies which obey the recursive rules given by the vector of functions
ft = (ht,k t), where  is an inﬁnite dimensional object and the key endogenous variables of
the problem. The second fundamental element we are looking for is a function which describes
the private sector response to a one-shot deviation of the government, when agents expect future
policies to be set by politicians according to  as a function of current state and political control
variables, kt+1 = ˜ K (ft,h t)12.
Before recursively solve the equilibrium policy rule ,w ei n v e s t i g a t et h em a r g i n a li m p a c to f
et and t on the parties’ objective function. Maximizing Eq. (9) with respect to both policies
and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain the following system of ﬁrst order conditions for


























where gi is the density function of Gi. Let us denote with  
g2
g1 as y n t h e t i cm e a s u r eo ft h e
ideological bias among voters which also represents the relative political weight of the old voters
cohort13. If 0 <<1 then on average, the old cohort cares less about ideology and has more
swing-voters than the adults one. For >1 the opposite holds, where the preferences of old in
the political debate represent the political majority. Finally, when  =1 , all voters are equally
represented. Using the indirect utility functions, Eq. (14) and (15), the following ﬁrst order
conditions are attained for t and et,r e s p e c t i v e l y 14:
12The function ˜ K is known only conditioning on the existence of .T od e r i v e˜ K start from Eq. (11):
kt+1 = K (ft,f t+1,h t)
Function K describes the equilibrium behavior of private agents as a function of current state and both current
and future policies. If there exists a dierentiable function ,w h i c hd e s c r i b e st h ep o l i c yb e h a v i o rf o l l o w e db y
politicians in equilibrium, this rule can be internalized by fully rational private agents. It follows that:
kt+1 = K (ft,(ht+1,k t+1),h t)
Plugging the Eq. ht+1 = H (et,h t) into the above equation and rearranging the terms we get:
kt+1 = ˜ K (ft,h t)
Due to the full depreciation of physical capital, ˜ K is not a function of current level of physical capital, which
strongly simpliﬁes the analyses.
13In other terms,  is a measure of how strongly the old generation pursues her own interest.
14Since in equilibrium the parties A and B face the same maximization problem and choose an identical political
platform, we remove the apex l.
130=(1 + ht)uC2,t   
oldsd i r e c tb e n e ﬁ t
 (1 + ht)uC1,t   
adults’ direct cost


























adults’ expected direct/indirect cost/beneﬁt
(18)
Let us ﬁrst refer to Eq. (17). At each time an interior solution for the income tax rate is
simply determined as the outcome of a weighted bargaining between current old and adults,
which get beneﬁts and sustain costs by a variation in tax level. The ﬁrst term in Eq. (17)
represents the old’s marginal beneﬁts in terms of PAYG social security due to the increase in
income tax rate. Since tax levying on labor income makes adults sustain the whole tax burden,
the second term captures the adults’ marginal cost caused by a positive variation on the ﬁscal
dimension. Finally the third term measures the expected marginal impact of current variation
in the tax rate on the utility of next-period old. Similarly, redistributive choices are taken as
the outcome of a weighted bargaining between current old and future one. An increase in public
higher education transfers is a double-edge sword. On one hand it makes current old sustain
direct costs due to reduction in social security contributions, represented by the ﬁrst part of
Eq. (18). On the other hand future old enjoy direct beneﬁts from expected return of productive
investment in human capital, whose eects are captured by the second part of Eq. (18).
Note that the FOCs (17) and (18) internalize the strategic eects, capturing how politicians
can aect future policies through their current choices of ft. If
dt+1
dt > 0( < 0) and
dt+1
det > 0
(< 0) agents know that a higher income tax rate and larger education transfers lead to a higher
(lower) tax rate in the future. Thus, representatives may strategically increase (reduce) t and
et in order to distort the tax rate outcome of tomorrow. The same idea holds for et+1.
4.2.1 Political SMPE with Perfect Foresight
Due to the non-linearity and bidimensionality in the political space, the system of partial dif-
ferential equations (17) and (18) cannot be easily solved using integration methods15.W es t a r t
solving simultaneously for the maximization of the decisive voter with respect to the income
tax rate and the level of public higher education transfers. As reported in Klein et al. (2008),
the equilibrium is obtained as the limit of a ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium, whose characteristics do
not signiﬁcantly depend on the time horizon, as long as the time horizon is long enough. Con-
sequently our resolution strategy consists in a constructive approach (induction method).W e
compute the FOCs deﬁning the feasible equilibrium policy rules in a ﬁnite-horizon environment
via backward induction. We start at a ﬁnal round t< and we re-compute the equilibrium
policy rules, t =( Et,T t), as long as all the direct dynamic feedbacks, induced by political
15See for example Grossman-Helpman (1996) and Azariadis-Galasso (2002) frameworks in which by applying
the envelope theorem the dierential equation becomes linear and solution results straightforward to determine.
14choices on private one, have been internalized. In particular, due to two-periods lag impact of
et on private saving choice, we will perform recursive maximization until period t  2.A te a c h
time political objective function, described in Eq. (9), has to be simultaneously maximized with
respect to its arguments, i.e. the pair (et,t),s u b j e c tt ot h eb a l a n c e db u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t ,E q .
(8),t h eE u l e rc o n d i t i o no ft h ee c o n o m i co p t i m i z a t i o np r o b l e m ,E q .(11),a n dt h ee q u i l i b r i u m
policy rules of the following periods, computed via backward procedure. Once a recursive struc-
ture is identiﬁable, making the time horizon goes to inﬁnity for all the time-variant coecients
determined so far, we obtain the equilibrium policy rules as ﬁxed point of the recursive problem
in multidimensional environment.
For notational purposes let us denote with i the relative political bargaining power for








Remark 1 The more population ages (i.e. n decreases and  increases), the smaller is the rel-
ative political weight of adults (1) and larger is the relative political weight of old (2).
Fixing  = 1
2,w ea n a l y t i c a l l yd e t e r m i n eaf u n d a m e n t a le q u i l i b r i u mc a p t u r i n gt h ee  e c t st h a t
are inherent in the dynamic game itself, which turns to be unique. Let Polbe the state-space in
which interior policy rules are simultaneously obtained and ¯ R  1+n
R(1+n) be an index measuring
the economy dynamic eciency. The following Theorem characterizes the equilibrium outcomes
of public choices in a fully rational environment when Markov strategies are implemented:












. Under dynamic eciency condition, for
any (ht,k t)  Pol the set of feasible rational policies, ft  (et,t), which can be supported by
a perfect foresight political SMPE, has the following functional form:
i.
E (ht)=a1ht + a0 (20)
where a1  














where b3  R1,b 2  (1+22),b 1  ¯ h1
 b2+ ¯ R

1+¯ h(1  )
2 and b0  2.
Otherwise, for any (ht,k t) /  Pol corner solutions result in at least one of the two dimen-
sions.
Proof. (See Appendix).
From a structural point of view, while the policy rule associated to education transfers
is linear in human capital production, the ﬁscal policy rule is a linear function in physical
capital but not in the human capital level. The equilibrium conditions predict the simultaneous
existence of both sides of the redistributive program for (ht,k t)  Pol.
154.3 Dynamics and Steady States
We now discuss the transition dynamics of the economy during the adjustment towards the
steady state.
Deﬁnition 4 (Law of Motion) The laws of motion of the collection {et,t,h t,k t}

t=0 are def-
inite as the mappings:
ht+1 = H (E (ht),h t),
et+1 = E (H (E (ht),h t)),
kt+1 = ˜ K (E (ht),T(ht,k t),h t),
t+1 = T

˜ K (E (ht),t,h t),H(E (ht),h t)

.
The economy dynamics is basically driven by the human capital evolution which aects both
the education transfers’ law of motion and the transition dynamics of taxation policy. While
the former is directly inﬂuenced only by human capital, the latter is aected by human capital
both directly and indirectly through physical capital. This implies that convergence conditions
in the state-space are also sucient for the stable convergence of the policy rules evolution. The
following Lemma states the conditions for economy’s convergence stability.








 1. Given any feasible
initial condition (h0,k 0),i f>and n>n , then the sequence {et,t,h t,k t}

t=0 is characterized
by stable monotonic convergence. The speed of convergence for t crucially depends on the initial
condition and the human capital society endowment.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Given the dierentiability of the policy functions, the interior solution conditions and Lemma
1, the following proposition holds:.
Proposition 1 The feasible steady state (e,,h ,k) exists and is unique.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Thus, depending on the initial condition, (h0,k 0),a n dt h el e v e lo ft h eh u m a nc a p i t a ls o c i e t y
endowment, ¯ h,t h ec o n t r o la n dt h es t a t ev a r i a b l e sc o n v e r g em o n o t o n i c a l l yt ot h eu n i q u ef e a s i b l e
steady state16.
5D i s c u s s i o n
The dynamic eciency requirement, R>1+n,i san e c e s s a r yc o n d i t i o nf o rt h es i m u l t a n e o u s
existence of PAYG and public education programs. In our economy, during the transition
path, the implicit net return to pensions is determined by both the population growth rate
and the marginal increase in the taxable income due to human capital investment net of the
current resources devoted to education. As long as the implicit net return is higher than the
16According to the particular emerging Welfare State regime (see Section 5.1) dierent speeds of convergence
and amounts of intergenerational transfers characterize the economy.
16capital rental price, there will emerge incentives in investing simultaneously in both sides of the
redistribution programs. By contradiction, suppose that the population growth rate exceeds the
net rental price to physical capital, then it is straightforward to prove that b1 tends to inﬁnity17
and, consequently, the human capital will aect negatively the size of government. Thus,
according to Eq. (6) and (21),a ni n c r e a s ei ne d u c a t i o ns p e n d i n gw o u l dd e t e r m i n eap o s i t i v e
variation in the stock of human capital and, in turn, a decrease in tax rate. Consequently, the
increase in physical capital will induce further reduction in the future tax level. This cannot
be an equilibrium since, given R<1+n,a g e n t sh a v ea l w a y sa ni n c e n t i v et od e v i a t ec h o o s i n g
higher level of income tax rate in order to depress private saving and guarantee a higher future
level in pension contributions even without investment in education. As long as the economy
is in a dynamic inecient scenario the simultaneous existence of both forward and backward
transfers is excluded. We depart from traditional literature on redistributive policies, where no
endogenous human capital formation is modelled, which states social security survives just in
an economy characterized by a population growth rate higher than the rental price.
As depicted in Figure 1,f o ra n yn o n - z e r ol e v e lo fi n c o m et a xr a t e ,t h el a r g e rt h eh u m a n
capital is, the more political support the education program receives, i.e. det
dht = a1 > 0. Two
dierent conﬁgurations may arise depending on the level of society human capital endowment.
As shown in Panel (a), as long as ¯ h< 1
(1),E(ht) lies within the feasibility boundaries,
(0, ˆ et), for any level of human capital. Instead, as reported in Panel (b),i f¯ h  1
(1),t h e r e
exists a threshold value of parental human capital, ˜ h 
1¯ h(1)
1 , such that for any level
of ht lower than ˜ h boundary solution is attained, i.e. E (ht)=ˆ et. In other terms, due to
complementarity between the inputs employed in the skill technology, the whole tax revenue
is devoted to investment in public education and no social security program is implemented.
Otherwise, if ht is higher than ˜ h,t h el a r g e rt h es t o c ko fh u m a nc a p i t a li s ,t h el o w e ri st h e
variation in education transfers and consequently the ﬂatter is the equilibrium policy function.
Indeed, due to the decreasing returns in parental human capital, in equilibrium politicians set
positive transfers both for education and social security18.
Remark 2 E (ht) doesn’t depend on strategic political components embedded in the parameter
. For the determination of the transfers’ level, only the mass eect component, n, matters.
As reported in Theorem 1,i ne q u i l i b r i u mt h ea m o u n to fe d u c a t i o nt r a n s f e r sh a st ob e
equal to the highest feasible value of forward spending which maximizes the net implicit rate
of future pensions. In other terms E (ht) maximizes the intertemporal utility of current adults
17See Proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A for the derivation of b1.
18Note that the scenario characterized by the whole tax revenue devoted to public higher education investments,
i.e. no current pension beneﬁts, is an equilibrium outcome only as long as one-period future pension transfers
are allocated to current adults. In other terms, when ¯ h 
1
(1) and ht < ˜ h, there exists an initial condition ˜ h0
such that for any h0 > ˜ h0, due to public investments in higher education, future human capital level exceeds the
threshold level ˜ h,i . e .ht+1  ˜ h.I nt h i sc a s ea d u l t sh a v ei n c e n t i v ei nt a x i n gt h e i ri n c o m eb e c a u s eo ft h ef u t u r e
expected beneﬁts in terms of PAYG social security. Thus there emerges a one-period-equilibrium characterized
by an intergenerational contract with current backward transfers equal to zero. Otherwise, if h0 < ˜ h0, then no
future pensions will be set for current adults and no incentive to implement an intergenerational contracts may
emerge.
17without considering the political distortions due to old’s bargaining power. This result sounds
to be counterintuitive, because, as shown in Eq. (18),o l dh a v ea c t u a l l yi n c e n t i v e si nr e d u c i n g
the education amount at the minimal level. This in turn, under dynamic eciency, would
remove the adults’ incentives in substituting private saving with public one. As ﬁnal result the
autarky would be established. It cannot be an equilibrium for the setting of an intergenerational
contract and, as a consequence, the emergence of a public education program not distorted by
the political bias is justiﬁed.
Figure 1: Education Transfers Policy Rule
Figure 2 reports the equilibrium ﬁscal policy rule described in Eq. (21). For illustrative
purpose, it is useful to disentangle the eects of the two asset variables on T (ht,k t) at each
time t.P a n e l (a) describes the structural relation between the equilibrium tax rate and the
level of ht where the intercept, T (kt,0), is a decreasing function in physical capital. As long
as kt < ˜ k where ˜ k  b1b2
b3 ,t h el a r g e rt h eh u m a nc a p i t a li s ,t h eh i g h e ri st h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s t
to tax levy, i.e. dt
dht < 0. If instead kt  ˜ k,i n c e n t i v e st oi n c r e a s es i m u l t a n e o u s l yt h et a x a b l e
income and the income tax rate arise, i.e. dt
dht  0.P a n e l(b) illustrates the structural relation
between the equilibrium tax rate and the level of kt. The equilibrium predicts for any value of
kt the higher the physical capital is, the lower is the income tax rate, consistently with previous
literature19. The intuition for the ﬁscal policy function to be non-increasing in the capital stock
is the following. By contradiction, if T (ht,k t) were increasing in kt,c u r r e n ta d u l tw o u l dh a v e
incentive to save in order to provide the next generation with a higher level of capital and
therefore receive a higher pension. This cannot be an equilibrium, since the higher amount of
backward transfer reduces the level of saving that workers are willing to make.
Remark 3 T (ht,k t) crucially depends on both the strategic political components embedded in
the parameter  and the demographic component, n, for the determination of the size of gov-
ernment.
19See among others Grossman and Helpman (1998),A z r i a d i sa n dG a l a s s o(2002),F o r n i(2005) and Bassetto
(2008).
18Figure 2: Income Tax Policy Rule
Due to the politicians’ opportunistic behavior, strategic persistency criterion drives the
setting of the income tax rate. In our environment human capital plays a crucial role in two
dierent ways. On one hand it mitigates the politicians’ strategic behavior. Precisely, the higher
the level of human capital is, the ﬂatter is the equilibrium policy function and the lower is the
elasticity of T (ht,k t) with respect to physical capital. The lower responsiveness of taxation
policy decisions on the level of private savings weakens the strategic channel through which
politicians can increase the probability to win election. On the other hand human capital
perturbs the political choice concerning the size of government. Depending on the political
bargaining intensity between adults and old embedded in the coecients b1 and b2 of Eq. (21),
the marginal impact of human capital on taxation decisions can be either positive or negative,
as already pointed out in the above analyses of equilibrium tax structure. Formally, let us deﬁne
¯ 2  ((1)¯ h)





2 > ¯ 2
2  ¯ 2
(22)
The relation states that an economy where 2  ¯ 2 experiences a political competition char-
acterized by a weak old bargaining power and b1  b2. If 2 > ¯ 2,t h e no l de x e r tas t r o n g
bargaining power and b1 >b 2.
To summarize, a complete description of the recursive Markovian structure including both
the economic environment and the political scenario is represented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Markovian Structure
The picture points out the strategic relations which provide the necessary incentives to
selﬁsh agents to sustain simultaneously backward redistributive policies and forward one, i.e.
(et,p t),a sd e s c r i b e da b o v e .
195.1 Welfare State Regimes
Figure 2 points out the strategic structural relation between income tax rate and human cap-
ital in the Markovian environment, which drives the economy towards dierent WSR. If pure
political factors matter in splitting the public spending, then a Politico WSR will emerge. If
the economic factors are also relevant, then a Politico-Economic WSR will arise. The follow-
ing Corollary fully characterizes the conditions for the identiﬁcation of the dierent regime
conﬁgurations:
Corollary 1 Given the stationary equilibrium policy rules T (ht,k t) and E (ht):
i. if b1  b2, then the Politico Complementarity Welfare State Regime, PCR, arises, i.e.
dt
dht  0;
ii. if b1 >b 2 and kt  ˜ k, then the Politico-Economic Complementarity Welfare State Regime,
PECR, arises, i.e. dt
dht  0;
iii if b1 >b 2 and kt < ˜ k, then the Politico-Economic Substitutability Welfare State Regime,
PESR, arises, i.e. dt
dht < 0.
Proof. (See Appendix).
While the economic factors driving the system into dierent WSR are endogenously deter-
mined by the capital asset accumulation through the saving choices, the political factors depend
on the relative bargaining power of voters. An economy characterized by a weak level of old
bargaining power in the political process, i.e. b1  b2, will experience a PCR, for any level of
kt.C o n t r a r i l y ,a ne c o n o m yw i t has t r o n gl e v e lo fo l d ’ sb a r g a i n i n gp o w e ri nt h ep o l i t i c a la r e n a ,
i.e. b1 >b 2, will experience a PECR if the system is high-capitalized, i.e. kt > ˜ k,o t h e r w i s ea
PESR will emerge if the economy is low-capitalized, i.e. kt < ˜ k.
Intuitively, as already pointed out, in equilibrium a higher level of current income tax rate
will determine a decrease of future physical capital stock and, consequently, an increase of future
tax rate. In the PCR, adults anticipate that, if they invest in education today, an increase in
future human capital will determine a further positive variation in the level of income tax
rate tomorrow. Given the increase in both the future tax rate and taxable income, i.e. gross
future pension beneﬁts, which maximize adult intertemporal utility, PCR emerges as the only
sustainable WSR when adult bargaining power prevails.
To fully characterized the public spending process, based on the WSR criterion, we move
the analyses to the equilibrium characterization for pension beneﬁts.
Corollary 2 Under decreasing return in education, in equilibrium the impact of education




Remark 4 The existence of a PAYG social security program supports public investment in
higher education even in absence of altruism .
20Independently from the WSR characterizing the economy, an increase in public education
transfers induces an higher pension beneﬁts in the future, creating the incentive for adults in
supporting the education program. Ceteris paribus,b ys u p p o r t i n ga nh i g h e re d u c a t i o nc o s t
today, the adults internalize that it will generate an higher taxable income of tomorrow, guar-
anteeing a higher level of pension beneﬁts when they will be old, for any level of T (·).
The interaction between political and economic institutions determine the amount and the
dynamic evolution of pension system.
Corollary 3 At each time t, for any given level of human capital, in PESR pension beneﬁts





When the adult’s bargaining power is suciently strong, i.e. b1  b2 and PCR arises, the
equilibrium pension beneﬁts reach the highest feasible level. Otherwise, when old prevail in the
political debate, depending on the physical capital stock, the pension beneﬁts are lower in a
high-capitalized economy then in a low-capitalized one.
To resume graphically, in Figure 4 we plot on the state-space (ht,k t) as illustrative case
the WSR conﬁgurations which arises under deﬁnite parameters’ conditions when ¯ h> 1
(1)
and h0 > ˜ h0
20.P a n e l (a) shows the case in which a weak level of adult bargaining power
characterizes the political scenario. Contrarily, Panel (b) allows for a strong bargaining power
of the adults.
Figure 4: Panel (a) shows the case for b2<b1,P a n e l(b) shows the case for b2>b1.
As long as kt < ˇ kt in both cases full expropriation occurs. The tax rate, equal to 100%
of labor income, is assigned either to ﬁnance only public education program if ht < ˜ h or to
support both redistributive social programs if ht  ˜ h.D i  e r e n t l y ,a s l o n g a s kt  ˆ kt autarky
economy takes place. The panel (a) reports the politico-economic parameters’ conﬁgurations
which makes PECR and PESR arise, i.e. b2 + b0 < 1 and b1 + b0 > 1.W h e r e a st h ep a n e l(b)
shows the emergence of PCR due the pure political factors, i.e. b2 >b 1.
20It should be note that if ¯ h 
1
(1),t h e nt h eh u m a nc a p i t a ld o e s n ’ tp l a ya n yr o l ei ns p l i t t i n gt h ep u b l i c
spending between education and retirement transfers. In other terms, it avoids the interesting case with pension
beneﬁts seated to zero.
215.2 Aging
Quantitatively, one of the most severe challenges concerning the intergenerational transfer sys-
tem in the developed economies regards the impact of population aging both in demographic
(n) and political () terms. Demographic aging, which represents the quantitative component
of the aging phenomenon, decreases partially the returns from a PAYG system in our economy
characterized by endogenous human capital formation. Political aging, which represents the
qualitative component of aging phenomenon, gives retirees stronger claim for pension beneﬁts
even on constant demographic terms. Based on the characterization of the political equilibrium,
we now consider how aging aects the policy decisions of representatives who face electoral con-
straints in the form of both the size of welfare state, represented by the tax rate T (·),a n dt h e
amount of intergenerational transfers, E (·) and P (·). Focusing on political aging the following
Corollary holds:
Corollary 4 The political aging, i.e. the increase in , has no quantitative impact on the
education transfers, dE
d =0 , and induces increase in the income tax rate, dT
d > 0. It follows,
for any level of ¯ h, dP
d > 0.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The political eect is captured by a decrease in the political weight for the adult, that is, an
increase in the political weight for the old. A stronger old ideological pressure in the political
debate implies an higher income tax rate. This in turn determines a larger social security
system supported by voting. Given the eciency criterion driving the implementation of public
education policy, the overall eect of political aging doesn’t distort E (·).
Corollary 5 The demographic aging, i.e. the decrease in n, induces an increase in education
transfers, dE
dn < 0, and has an ambiguous impact on the income tax rate, dT




Departing from previous literature suggesting the size of social security to be increasing
in population growth, our model predicts under which parametric condition also the inverse
relation appears. Speciﬁcally, demographic aging has an ambiguous impact on the amount of
pension transfers in per-capita terms. A ﬁrst interesting case arises when the margin R(1 + n)
is suciently small, which in turns implies, even without considering the human capital return,
the implicit return to pensions to be close to the gross return to private saving. It gives incentives
in a younger society to opting for higher pension beneﬁts due to their larger demographic return,
i.e. dP
dn > 0. A second illustrative case emerges when the relative adults political weight is larger
than ¯ R and ¯ h is suciently high. In this scenario, even if population ages and, in turns, the
demographic pension returns decrease, adults have incentives in depressing the current level of
savings in order to compensate the smaller number of future tax payers with higher tax rate
level tomorrow, i.e. dP
dn < 0.
226B e n e v o l e n t G o v e r n m e n t A l l o c a t i o n
In Section 4 we proved the existence of a bidimensional ﬁscal plane when public policy choices are
taken through a repeated voting system. The politico-economic SMPE was also characterized
in closed-form as a ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium when the time goes to inﬁnity. We now imple-
ment as normative benchmark the inﬁnite-horizon Gvt allocation under zero-cost enforceability
constraint.
As in the political game, we exclude private agents’ default on the implemented ﬁscal plane
within the period. Furthermore, under balanced budget constraint government platform is










t)), where the apex g stands for Gvt. Given











t t ((1 + n)u(C1,t (·)) + u(C2,t (·))) (23)
subject to the technological constraints given by Eq. (6) and (11).
The Gvt does not take into account the ideological bias, ,b u ts h ea s s i g n saw e l f a r ew e i g h t ,
,t oe a c hd y n a s t y .L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h er e s t r i c t i o n<¯   1
1+n,w h i c hi n d u c e sw e a kd e t e r r e n c e
power.




 (1 + n)(1+)




 (1   (1 + n))
 +  (1 + n)
(24)
Dierently from the relative political bargaining power of adults and old, Eq. (19),i n
the inﬁnite-horizon game the Gvt takes into account both the relative welfare weight of the
representative agent, 
g




Remark 6 The more population ages (i.e. n decreases), the smaller is relative welfare weight













As in Klein at al. (2008)21, let us rewrite in recursive way the sequential Gvt program in
order to derive the Gvt Generalized Euler Equations (GEEs)22, which capture the Gvt optimal
trade-os between taxation and redistribution wedges over time. Due to stationarity, we omit
21Recent studies extend the dynamic politico-economic modelling to the inﬁnite-horizon Gvt problem as in
Klein et al. (2008) and Azzimonti et al. (2009). These models dier from ours in that the policy space is
one-dimensional and the dynamic linkages are not long-run persistent due to the full depreciation of the relevant-
payo state variables. Departing from past literature we ﬁnd analytical solutions in a multi-dimensional state
space where the equilibrium policies become non trivially dependent on fundamental asset variables.
22The GEE is the FOCof the government maximization program. It is obtained deriving the Bellman equation
with respect to the political control variables, f
g. GEE can be equivalently derived by using Bellman’s principle
to identify a Markov equilibrium with the solution of the sequential version of the Governemt program. The
Euler equation of this sequential problem is exactly the GEE.
23the time subscript, denoting by the prime symbols next-period values. The economic ﬁrst
order condition, Eq. (10),r e q u i r e s (fg,fg,h,h ,k)=0 . In equilibrium, by implicit function
theorem, there exists a unique k = K (fg,fg,h,h ) satisfying  (fg,fg,h,h ,K(·)) = 0. If
there exists a policy rule g (h,k) which solves the Gvt optimization program, then under the
transformation function of human capital, h = H(eg,h),w ed e r i v et h er e c u r s i v ef o r m u l a t i o n
of K (·), whose functional form is then equal to k = ˜ K (fg,h)23. The recursive economic ﬁrst
order condition becomes 

fg,h, ˜ K (fg,h)

=0 .D e r i v a t i n gt h ef u n c t i o n (·) with respect to
its arguments we obtain ˜ Kfg = 

fg
k and ˜ Kh = 

h
k , which give a measure of the variation in
the amount of savings due to a change in either policies or human capital.
After some manipulations24,E q .(23) can be reformulated in terms of Bellman equation, as
follows:
V g (h,k) = max
{fg,h,k}
[(1 + n)u(C1 (·)) + u(C2 (·))] + (1 + n)V g 
h,k
(25)
We now provide the formal deﬁnition of the Gvt equilibrium allocation without commitment.
Deﬁnition 5 (Benevolent Government Allocation) A perfect foresight SMPE of the Benev-
olent Government problem is deﬁned as the sequence of feasible individual choices {c1,c 2,h ,k}
and policies fg, such that, given the Bellman Eq. (25), the functional vector of dierentiable
policy decision rules, g =( Tg,Eg), where Tg : R  R  (0,1) and Eg : R  R  (0, ˆ e)
are respectively the taxation policy rule, g = Tg (h,k), and public higher education policy rule,
eg = Eg (h,k), satisﬁes the following conditions:
i.
g (h,k) = argmax
fg
[(1 + n)u(C1 (·)) + u(C2 (·))] + (1 + n)V g 
h,k







h = H (eg,h)
where H (·) and K (·) are deﬁned in Eq. (6) and Eq. (11).
ii.
V g (h,k)=M (V g)(h,k)




is deﬁned as follows:
M (V g)(h,k) := max
fg [(1 + n)u(C1 (·)) + u(C2 (·))] + (1 + n)V g

H (·), ˜ K (fg,h)

23For derivation details see note 13.
24See Appendix B for the derivation of both Bellman equation and GEEs.
24The ﬁrst condition requires the political variables, fg,h a v et ob ec h o s e nb yt h eG v ti n
order to maximize the utilitaristic social welfare, internalizing the equilibrium private saving
decision and all the direct and indirect feedback eects. The second requirement is the ﬁx point
condition, given the mapping M (V g).
In terms of wedges, the GEEs of the sequential Gvt program with respect of e and  are as
follows25:






























de and the ﬁrst best wedges x with
x { s,,e}26 are equal to:
s  uC1  RuC
2 savings/consumption wedge
  (1 + h)(uC2  uC1) backward redistribution wedge
e  He









 uC2 forward redistribution wedge
Under dierentiability condition of policy rules we are able to provide a non-trivial formu-
lation of the government ﬁrst order condition in the case of no commitment. The above wedges
can be interpreted as potential deviations from the ecient intertemporal decisions and they
acquire straightforward economic meaning in the recursive dynamic environment. Note that,
although the inﬁnite persistent impact of the current tax rate and public education investment,
only the current and the subsequent period matter directly. Thus the marginal costs and ben-
eﬁts in equilibrium can be summarized by terms involving only two consecutive periods. As a
consequence, the GEEs can also be viewed as resulting from a variational (two-periods) problem
(Klein et al., 2008). In other words, let us think of our variational problem as follows: given
the state variables (h,k) and (h,k) ﬁxed, let us vary (h,k) through the controls (,) and
(e,e),i no r d e rt oo b t a i nt h eh i g h e s tp o s s i b l eu t i l i t y .R e c a l l i n gt h a tt h eSMPE in the political
case has been obtained as the limit of a ﬁnite horizon economy, whose convergence has been
attained after two periods, we may easily conjecture no structural dierences between the two
equilibrium policy rules. For this reason in the following paragraph we will use the guess of the
political equilibrium to verify the GEEs and obtain the Gvt solution without commitment.
Before solving quantitatively the Gvt problem, let us interpret the GEEs rewritten in terms
25See appendix B for the detailed derivation.
26The wedges s, and e are derived as the marginal direct impact on the intertemporal agents’ util-
ity respectively of a variation in individual savings, taxation/pension contribution and education investments.
For example, a marginal variation in the income tax rate detemines a direct cost for current adults equal to
 (1 + n)(1+h)uc1 and a direct beneﬁts for current old equal to  (1 + n)(1+h)uc2. The intergenerational
backward redistribution wedge becomes then    (1 + n)(1+h)uc2  (1 + n)(1+h)uc1 which normalized
by (1 + n)(1+h) is equal to   uc2  uc1. The same characterization holds for s and e.
25of a linear weighted combination of wedges. First consider Eq. (27). Due to a marginal increase
in taxation, ,t h ei n t e r t e m p o r a ls a v i n g sw e d g e ,s,i ss c a l e db yt h er e d u c t i o ni nh o u s e h o l d
savings, ˜ K < 0.F u r t h e r m o r ea ni n c r e a s ei ni n c o m et a xr a t ed e t e r m i n e sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eg a p
between uC2 and uC1which is captured by the intratemporal utility wedge, . Note that, due to
full depreciation of physical capital k is equal to ˜ K (f,h ) and it is not a function of k. Then a
variation in the current tax rate does not aect next period’s wedges through its eect on future
level of physical capital. More cumbersome dynamic eects emerge instead from the equilibrium
determination of public education transfers, Eq. (26).A sb e f o r ea ni n c r e a s ei ne makes private
savings wedge scaled by the variation in household savings, ˜ Ke < 0, which is negative due to the
substitution eects with public savings that are increased via the retributive pension scheme.
The second component, e,r e p r e s e n t st h ei n t e r t e m p o r a lu t i l i t yv a r i a t i o nd u et oa ni n c r e a s ei n
education transfers today, which aects the utility of current old and simultaneously a variation
of the next-period adults’ and old’s utility through h. Finally, dierently from ,av a r i a t i o ni n
the current level of education transfers also aect next period’s wedges, 
,t h r o u g hi t se  e c t
on h, which induces a variation of both k and h.
6.1 The Government SMPE
To solve the Government optimization problem, we guess a time consistent bidimensional policy
structurally equivalent to Eq. (20) and (21), which veriﬁes the conditions (26) and (27).F i x i n g
 = 1
2, let Gvt be the state-space in which interior policy rules are obtained. Then the next
Proposition characterizes the optimal feasible time-consistent policy rules:
Proposition 2 Under dynamic eciency condition, for any (h,k)  Gvt the set of individual
feasible rational policies, fg  (eg,g), which can be supported by a Government SMPE with
























































2 + ¯ R(
g
O 





For any (h,k) /  Gvt corner solutions result in at least one of the two dimensions.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The two equilibrium concepts described in deﬁnition 3 and 5 lead to the implementation of
the same education program. Speciﬁcally, in equilibrium both the Gvt and the oce-seeking
politicians set the same amount of forward transfers, inducing education-ecient political ﬁscal
26planes, as already discussed in Paragraph 5,i . e .Eg (h)=E (h) for any level of human capital.
The main dierence concerns their quantitative predictions on the taxation policy dimension,
which are fully captured by the policy parameters. In the following subsection we discuss in
details how a political equilibrium divergences from the Gvt optimal allocation.
6.2 Are the political choices on pensions and education optimal?
Both the politicians and the Gvt have incentives to provide intergenerational transfers in the
environment introduced in section 3.M o r e o v e r ,t h e i re q u i l i b r i u mp o l i c i e ss h a r es i m i l a rs t r u c -
tural properties. However the quantitative dierences detected so far imply distinct predic-
tions in terms of WSRs’ identiﬁcation and political behavior. For this reason we now exam-
ine how the politicians act relatively to the Gvt in terms of taxation design. In order to
obtain clear predictions, we normalize the vector of welfare weights by  assigning  

.
Consequently we are able to write the relative welfare weights, Eq. (24),i nt e r m so fp o l i t i -






















terms (,g) delimits the parametric space in which PCR emerges respectively for the political
and the Gvt cases. The following Corollary resumes the conditions for the Welfare regimes’
comparison between the political and Gvt cases in the parametric space (,n).
Corollary 6 For any level of ¯ h and n  (n,n) the following condition holds:   g.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The parametric space in which PCR emerges is always larger in the Gvt environment than
in the political one. Furthermore let ¯  be a suciently large value of the ideological bias28,s u c h
that for any <¯ , the following Proposition is stated.
Proposition 3 For <¯  and for any <¯ , the political SMPE induces overtaxation with
respect to the time-consistent Government SMPE, i.e. T (ht,k t) >Tg (ht,k t) for any (ht,k t) 
Pol Gvt.
Proof. (See Appendix).
According to the above proposition, if the Gvt adopts a politically equivalent system of
welfare weights, for any value of human and physical capital the level of income tax rate is
always lower than in the political case, i.e. T (ht,k t) >Tg (ht,k t).W ec o n c l u d et h a tp o l i t i c i a n s
involved in a Markov game among successive generations of players deliver the Gvt allocation
if they reduce the political weight they assign to the old agents. Given the invariant level of
education transfers achieved by both the politicians and the Gvt, high tax rate implies pension
beneﬁts too generous. These distortions come from the politicians’ strategic behavior. In
determining taxation rules, short-lived politicians take into account that future politicians will










28See proof of Proposition 1 for the exact determination of ¯ .
27compensate the ﬁscal cost of current adults by paying the pensions in their old age. This stems
from the fact that higher taxes on today environment lead to a lower private wealth in old
age, i.e. to a lower state variable in the following period, thereby triggering more transfers by
the future politicians. The policy response of the future politicians thus reduces the current
(electoral) cost of transferring resources to the elderly and leads to overspending, unless the adult
enjoy an unusually large political power. Consequently, by transferring too much resources to
old age due to both the overrepresenting of current elderly agents and the policy response of
the future politicians, the politicians fail to provide the optimal income tax rate policy.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we investigate the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational con-
tracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We
present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where political rep-
resentatives compete proposing multidimensional ﬁscal platforms. Both backward and forward
intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension beneﬁts and higher education in-
vestments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with income
taxation when agents play Markovian strategies. The inﬁnite horizon Gvt solution without
commitment is used as benchmark to evaluate the eciency of politically determined rules.
The dynamic mechanisms driving our results are intuitive: Social security system sustains
investment in public education, that, in turns, creates a dynamic linkage across periods through
both human and physical capital driving the economy towards dierent WSR.
We show that intergenerational contracts may be politically sustained uniquely as long as
the economy is in dynamic eciency, i.e. the rental gross price of capital is larger than the
economic growth rate. Departing from the previous literature, our economic environment is
in line with empirical ﬁndings on the dynamic eciency status of most developed countries,
especially after the demographic transition. By endogenizing human capital formation through
public education investments, backward and forward redistributive programs may optimally self-
sustain each other even in the absence of a benevolent Gvt. In equilibrium political decisions
are education ecient.
Relatively to the prediction about the transition towards the steady state, we ﬁnd three
dierent WSR may emerge depending on both the relative political bargaining power between
adults and old and the endogenous capital asset accumulation. The emergence of dierent
regimes leads the economy towards dierent dynamic paths and persistence degrees of distor-
tionary redistribution. In the regime supported by adults, the equilibrium pension beneﬁts
reach the highest feasible level.
Demographic aging increases the equilibrium per-capita level of forward transfers, i.e. public
education spending. Due to the decreasing return in human capital accumulation aging does
not always exacerbate the generous behavior of the politicians towards the elderly. Political
aging has instead positive impact on taxation but no eects on the level of public education
investments.
28Finally, due to the distortions generated by repeated political competition process and to
the political overrepresentation of elderly agents, political equilibrium is characterized by over-
taxation compared with the Gvt solution.
Our analysis leaves some natural directions for future research. We have assumed only
adults and old compete in the political debate. Using the developed methodology, a change
in the voting rule, which enables also the young to vote, would generate dierent equilibrium
allocations both in terms of education transfers and government size. Another direction for
future research concerns the introduction of a dynamic electoral stage by endogenizing the
probability of re-election, which would introduce a new source of distortion.
298T e c h n i c a l A p p e n d i x A
Proof of Theorem (1).
Following Klein et al. (2008),o u rr e s o l u t i o ns t r a t e g yc o n s i s t si nc o m p u t i n gt h eﬁ r s to r d e r
conditions starting from a time t< large enough and solving backward for each time t  j
with j =1 ,2,...,s u b j e c tt o :1) the economic Euler condition, Eq. (10), 2) the balanced budget
constraint, Eq. (8),a n d3) the equilibrium policy rules of the following periods. We recursively
determine the conditions for the existence of ﬁxed points taking the limit for j  .
Suppose the economy ends at time t< and adults at that time have one period temporal-
horizon. Thus, the political objective function is as follows:
Wt  (1 + n)u(C1,t)+u(C2,t) (1A)
where C1,t  (1 + ht)(1 t) and C2,t  (1 + n)Rkt + pt.A t t i m e t there are no incentives
in investing in education, i.e. et =0 .A s s u m i n g i n t e r i o r s o l u t i o n , t h e ﬁ s c a l d i m e n s i o n , t,i s







Under logarithmic utility, the functional form of the equilibrium ﬁscal policy rule at time t is
t = R1,t
kt
1+ht + 2,t where 1,t  1+n
1+n+ and 2,t 

1+n+.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h ee q u i l i b r i u m








where b1(0)  R1,t and b0(0)  2,t. The number in the brackets represents the number of
iterations.
Next we consider period t  1, in which adults born at time t  2 live up three periods29.
The political objective function is now as follows:
Wt1  (1 + n)(u(C1,t1)+u(C2,t)) + u(C2,t1) (4A)
where C1,t1  (1 + ht1)(1 t1)  (1 + n)kt and C2,t1  (1 + n)Rkt1 + pt1.A f t e r
plugging the equilibrium policy rules of period t,E q .(3A),i n t oE q .(4A), we maximize with




















Equating the two conditions in (5A),w eg e tt h en e c e s s a r yc o n d i t i o nf o rt h ed e t e r m i n a t i o no f
29Due to three-periods eects of the political variable e not all the intergenerational direct dynamic feedbacks
are internalized at time t  1 and further recursion is necessary.
30the equilibrium level of et1,i . e . dht








det1 into the equilibrium condition, we derive the equilibrium public education




 and (1) = 1+n
R .B y s o l v i n g t h e s y s t e m
















1+n (1), a1(1)  
1+n(1) and b0(1)  2,t1, b1(1)  (1)2,t1, b2(1) 





(1) and b4(1)  R1,t1. Now 2,t1 
2 

+(1+n)(1+) and 1,t1  1 
(1+n)(1+)
+(1+n)(1+) are, respectively, the indexes of the relative
old’s and adults’ political power in an economy that lasts more than one period.
Finally let us consider time t  2.A t t h i s p o i n t , a l l t h e d i r e c t d y n a m i c f e e d b a c k s a r e
internalized. The political objective function is equivalent to Eq. (4A). The recursive problem is
now subject to the equilibrium policy rules of the next two periods, (3A) and (6A).M a x i m i z i n g






































2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
let us introduce the following notation g(2)  1+n
R (1)+(2). As before, solving the system (7A)












Et2 = a1(2)ht1 + a0(2)
(8A)











12), b4(2)  b4(1) and a0(2) 
(1)¯ h
1+n (2), a1(2)  
1+n(2). It is straightforward
to show that (2) can be derived as a dierentiable monotonic transformation of (1), m(·),



































(2) + ... + (j)
31Using the above notation, starting from t  3 we can ﬁnally derive the recursive structure
















1+n (j), a1(j)  
1+n(j) and b0(j)  b0(1), b1(j)  (j)2, b2(j)  (1  )(( 1+
1
12)(j) + 





, b4(j)  b4(1).
If a political SMPE exists, then the limits for j of the set of time-variant parameters

a0(j),a 1(j),b 0(j),b 1(j),b 2(j),b 3(j),b 4(j)

exist and are ﬁnite. Note that the ﬁxed points determi-
nation for the two stationary policy rules crucially depends on the existence of the ﬁxed point
of the policy e and, in ﬁnal instance, on the determination of the limit for (j). Thus, we start
with the redistributive policy dimension. The computation consists in solving the non-linear
dierence equation (9A). The lim
j
(j) is equivalent to the solution(s), if any, of such dier-





=1 .W e y i e l d r e s p e c t i v e l y z e r o , o n e o r t w o ﬁ x e d p o i n t s a s s o l u t i o n o f t h e

















Note that R>  in all the parameters’ space. Such condition guarantees the existence of at
least one stable ﬁxed point. For analytical tractability we determine the solutions for quadratic
form case. For  = 1




























0 =  as initial condition. The solution of the dierence equation (9A) is represented in
Figure 6.
Figure 6: (j+1)=m[(j)]
32Under the condition R>(1 + n) the lim
j
(j) <  is equal to 1+n
R(1+n)  ¯ R. Consequently
the lim
j




















convergence conditions the ﬁxed points are ﬁnally attained. Rearranging the terms we can


















+ ¯ R2,b 2   (1 + 22) and b3  R1;
E (ht)=a1ht + a0 (13A)
where a0  1
1+n
¯ h and a1  
1+n.
We denote with (K
t ,H
t )={(kt,h t)|ˇ kt <k t < ˆ kt} where ˆ kt  b2+b0
b3 ht + b1+b0
b3 and ˇ kt(ht) 
b2+b01
b3 ht + b1+b01





{ht|ht  (˜ h,)}
if ¯ h< 1
(1)
if ¯ h  1
(1)
where ˜ h 
1¯ h(1)
1 .J o i n t l yc o n s i d e r i n gt h ea b o v ef e a s i b i l i t yc o n d i t i o n sf o rb o t hﬁ s c a la n d
redistributive dimensions, non-degenerate policies, i.e. t  (0,1) and et  (0, ˆ et),a r ea c h i e v e d
at each time for any (kt,h t)  Pol  (K
t ,H
t )  He
t .
Proof of Lemma (1). Let us ﬁrst consider the transition dynamics of ht and et.P l u g g i n g
the equilibrium education transfers, Eq. (20),i n t ot h eh u m a nc a p i t a lp r o d u c t i o n ,E q .(6),w e
obtain the law of motion ht+1 = Hd (ht), which is equal to:





 and 1  
1+n

. It should be noted the serial correlation between
current and future level of human capital is always positive, i.e. 1  0, To determine the law
of motion of the redistributive policy we plug Eq. (6) into the equilibrium education policy rule
at time t +1 . The law of motion et+1 = Ed (ht) is then as follows:
et+1 = 1ht + 0 (15A)








. Note that, if the dynamics of ht is characterized by
stable convergence, i.e. 1 < 1,t h e na l s ot h ed y n a m i c so fet is convergent toward the steady
state. Thus, using the expression of 1,t h es u  c i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o rt h ec o n v e r g e n c es t a b i l i t yo f










 1. Due to linearity, both ht and et converge monotonically
33toward the steady states.
Let us now analyze the transition dynamics of kt and t. First, consider the following
recursive formulation for the equilibrium saving under log-utility, kt+1 = ˜ K (et,t,h t), which is
obtained plugging the human capital production, Eq. (6),a n dt h ee x p e c t e de q u i l i b r i u mp o l i c i e s
et+1 and t+1 according to Eq. (20) and (21). The saving function can then be rewritten as
follows:
kt+1=
R(1 + ht)(1 t)
(R(1 + )b3)(1+n)

(b0+b2(1 + n)a1)H (et,h t)+(b0+b1(1 + n)a0)
R(1 + )b3
(17A)
Plugging the equilibrium policy rules, Eq. (20) and Eq. (21),i n t oE q . (17A),w eo b t a i nt h e
law of motion kt+1 = Kd (ht,k t):




(1 + n)(R(1 + )b3)
1 









b0+b1a0 (1 + n)
(R(1 + )b3)
+




(1 + n)(R(1 + )b3)

It should be noted that current and future level of physical capital are positively interrelated
each other, 2  0,o nt h ec o n t r a r yt h ew a yht perturbs kt+1 depends on the WSR’s intensity
embedded in 1.
Under condition (16A),t h ed y n a m i c so fp h y s i c a lc a p i t a li sc h a r a c t e r i z e db ys t a b l ec o n v e r -
gence if 2 < 1, which requires:
> (19A)
where    (R  (1 + n)).L e tu sd e n o t eb yQh
t  1+ht
1+ht+1.P l u g g i n gE q .(14A) and (17A) into
the equilibrium income tax policy at time t+1,a f t e rs o m em a n i p u l a t i o n s ,w ea t t a i nt h el a wo f
motion t+1 = Td (t,h t), as follows:



















R(1 + )(b0+b2)(1 + n)b3a1
R(1 + )b3
34Note that, under Eq. (16A),t h ec o n v e r g e n c ec o n d i t i o nf o rkt,E q .(19A),i sa l s os u  c i e n t
for the convergence of t,i . e . (h) < 1.F u r t h e r m o r et h es p e e do fc o n v e r g e n c ef o rt basically
depends on the WSR characterizing the economy jointly with the exogenous human capital
society endowment. To show how such elements may aect the type of convergence let us take









 R(1 + )(1+n)(b1b2)1
(1 + n)(R(1 + )  b3)(1+1ht+0)
2
It is straightforward to show how the sign of
d(ht)
dht crucially depends on the dierences (a1a0)
and (b1b2) and in ﬁnal instance on ¯ h,a n do nt h er e l a t i v ep o l i t i c a lp o w e rw e i g h t so fa d u l t s











speed of convergence toward the steady state is lower (higher) than in the opposite case.
Figure 7: Panel (a) shows the law of motion of et, Panel (b) shows the law of motion of t.
From a qualitative point of view the dynamics of et and t are mirror image respectively to
the dynamics of ht and kt. They mainly dier from an autoregressive component of inﬁnite order
in the past level of public education, which arises because of the inﬁnite persistence of education
spending on the future level of human capital through the parental transmission. The Figure 7
emphasizes the dynamics of the political variables. The Panel (a) shows that, once the human
capital converges to the steady state also the education policy reaches its balanced growth path.
Dierently, the Panel (b) highlights how the convergence condition of ht is necessary but not
sucient for the stable convergence of the ﬁscal policy rule, which also requires the dynamic
stability of kt.
Proof of Proposition (1). Under Lemma 1, due to linearity of the laws of motion, Eq.
(14A),(15A),(18A) and (20A),t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u es t e a d ys t a t e{e,,h ,k}.E q u a t i n g
ht+1 = ht = h in Eq. (14A) and kt+1 = kt = k in Eq. (18A), the following steady state levels
for the state variables are obtained:
h =
(1  )¯ h






R(b0+b21)+(1 + n)(b0+b2(1 + n)a1)1
b3 ((1 + n)+R)R(1 + )(1+n)
h (22A)
+
((1 + n)(1+0)+R)b0+((1+n)+R)b1+(1+n)b20(1 + n)
2 (a10+a0)R
b3 ((1 + n)+R)R(1 + )(1+n)
Plugging Eq. (21A) and (22A) into the equilibrium policy rules described in Theorem 1,w e
obtain the following the steady states levels for the political control variables:
e =
(1  )¯ h




(1 + n)(R(1 + )(b1b2)+(1+n)(a1a0)b3)





b3 ((1 + n)+R)  R(1 + )(1+n)

(1 + n)(R(1 + )(b0+b2)(1 + n)b3a1)
b3 ((1 + n)+R)  R(1 + )(1+n)
By balanced budget constraint the pension steady state level is:
p =( 1+n)(1+h)  (1 + n)
2 e
Proof of Corollary (1). The proof is straightforward. The derivative of Eq. (21) with




b3kt + b2  b1
(1 + ht)
2 (25A)
For any level of kt, if b1  b2,t h e ndt
dht  0. Otherwise, if b1 >b 2,t h e nt h es i g no fE q .(25A)
depends on the value reached by kt.W h e n kt < ˜ k where ˜ k  b1b2
b3 the income tax rate is a
decreasing function of ht,i . e . dt
dht < 0. The opposite holds for kt  ˜ k.
Proof of Corollary (2). Given the balanced budget constraint (8), let us denote with
P (ht,k t)  (1 + n)(1+ht)T (ht,k t)(1 + n)
2 E (ht) the equilibrium pension policy rule. Un-
der the decreasing return in education and the equilibrium level of policy rules, Eq. (21) and
Eq. (20), the total amount of pension contributions can be rewritten as follows:
pt+1 = P (ht+1,k t+1)  (1 + n)(b3kt+1 +( b2 + b0  (1 + n)a1)ht+1 +( b1 + b0  (1 + n)a0))
(26A)
























R(1 + )(1+n)(b2 + b0  a1 (1 + n))




Noting that (b2 + b0  a1 (1 + n)) > 0 and R(1 + )  b3 > 0,E q .(28A) takes always positive
values for any Welfare Regime and in the whole state space.
Proof of Corollary (3). Let us denote with  = b2+b0
b1+b0 am e a s u r eo ft h eW e l f a r eS t a t e
Regimes’ intensity. According to Eq. (22),t h eh i g h e rt h ea d u l t s ’r e l a t i v ep o w e ri s ,t h el a r g e ri s
the value of . Normalizing the Eq. (26A) by the factor (b1 + b0),w eo b t a i n :
˚ pt =( 1+n)

˚ b3kt +(   (1 + n)˚ a1)ht +( 1 (1 + n)˚ a0)

(29A)
where ˚ pt 
pt
b1+b0,˚ b3  b3
b1+b0, ˚ a0  a0
b1+b0 and ˚ a1  a1
b1+b0.T a k i n gt h ed e r i v a t i v e so fE q .(29A)
with respect to  and kt,t h em a r g i n a li m p a c t s
d˚ pt
d =( 1+n)ht > 0 and
d˚ pt
dkt = (1 + n)˚ b3 < 0
are attained. In other words, the higher the level of  and the lower the level of physical capital
are, the larger is the amount of pension beneﬁts.
Proof of Corollary (4). The equilibrium education transfer chosen by politicians is the linear
policy rule E (ht)=a1ht+a0, with a1 and a0 deﬁned in Theorem 1.P o l i t i c a lp o p u l a t i o na g i n g ,
an increase in , does not aect at all the amount of equilibrium forward transfers, then dE
d =0 .







1+ht +b0, where the coecients are fully described in Proposi-
tion 2.Av a r i a t i o ni nt h ee x o g e n o u sp o l i t i c a li d e o l o g i c a lb i a s determines the following marginal
changes in the structural parameters: db3
d = 
R(1+n)(1+)







(R(1+n))(+(1+n)(1+))2 > 0 and db0
d =
(1+n)(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2 > 0. Then, for any level of ¯ h
dT
d > 0, which implies positive correlation between the pension beneﬁts and the ideological bias
in favor of old agents. Finally, using the above results, the derivative of pensions transfers ob-
tained by balanced budget constraint, P (ht,k t)=( 1+n)((1+ht)T (ht,k t)  (1 + n)E (ht)),
with respect to the political aging parameter is dP
d =( 1+n)





Proof of Corollary (5). To determine the eect of demographic population aging on the level
of education transfers chosen by politicians, i.e. a decrease in n, note that da1
dn =  
(1+n)2 < 0
and da0
dn =  1
(1+n)2¯ h < 0. Then it follows dE
dn < 0. Concerning the impact of n on the political




(+(1+n)(1+))2 > 0, db2
dn = 
(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2 < 0, db1
dn = D0 + D1D2 
0, where D0 

(R(1+n))(+(1+)(1+n)) > 0, D1 
(1+n+¯ h(1)R)









 ¯ R  A





Then it follows that dT
dn  0 depending on the dierence
 ¯ R  A

and on the level of ¯ h.
In particular a sucient condition to yield dT
dn < 0 is ¯ R<A and ¯ h high enough. Fi-
nally the marginal variation of pension beneﬁts due to population growth is equal to dP
dn =
(1 + n)((1+ht) dT
dn  (1 + n) dE
dn)  0.
379T e c h n i c a l A p p e n d i x B
9.1 Derivation of recursive formulation and Generalized Euler Equation
We derive the recursive formulation of the Gvt program starting from its sequential version:
V
g









t ,h t,k t,k t+1) (1B)
where (h0,k 0) are the initial conditions of the payo-relevant state variables of the dynamic opti-
mization program and U (f
g
t ,h t,k t,k t+1)  (1 + n)u(C1,t (
g
t,h t,k t+1))+u(C2,t (f
g
t ,h t,k t)).
Equivalently we rewrite the above value function in the following terms:
V
g
















t ,h t,k t,k t+1)
(2B)
By deﬁnition, we have:
V
g










t ,h t,k t,k t+1) (3B)
Due to stationarity condition the indirect utility function satisﬁes V
g
0 (·)  V
g
1 (·)  ...  V
g
t (·).
We omit time indexes and denote by prime symbol next period variables. Plugging Eq. (3B)
into Eq. (2B) we yield the following Bellman equation:





+( 1+n)V g 
h,k
subject to the constraints k = K (fg,g (h,k),h)= ˜ K (fg,h) and h = H (eg,h). Then the
Bellman equation can be rewritten as follows:
V g (h,k) = max
fg U





H (eg,h), ˜ K (fg,h)

(4B)
The GEE are obtained as the ﬁrst order condition of the Gvt optimization plan. The
derivation below follows the method proposed by Klein et al. (2008) extending to the OLG case
with two political controls in bidimensional state-space. In the following let us denote with Yx 
Y
x the partial derivative of Y with respect to x, while dY
dx denotes total derivative. Furthermore,
for simplicity of notation we will omit the apex g. The political ﬁrst order conditions of Eq.
(4B) with respect to f  (e,) are equal to:
0=Ue + Uk ˜ Ke +( 1+n)

VhHe + Vk ˜ Ke

(5B)
0=U + Uk ˜ K +( 1+n)Vk ˜ K (6B)
Using Benveniste-Scheinkman formula we obtain the following expression for Vh and Vk:
38Vh = Uh + Uk ˜ Kh +( 1+n)

VhHh + Vk ˜ Kh

(7B)
Vk = Uk (8B)










U + Uk ˜ K
(1 + n) ˜ K
(10B)
Plugging Eq. (9B) and (10B) into (7B) we get the ﬁnal expression for Vh :
Vh = Uh +








Using stationarity condition and plugging Eq. (8B) and (11B) into (5B) and (6B),w eo b t a i n
the GEEs of the Gvt problem respectively for e and :






























 ˜ K (13B)
From deﬁnition of U (·),w eh a v e :Ue =  (1 + n)
2 uC2,U  =( 1+n)(1+h)(uC2  uC1),
Uh =( 1+n)(uC2 +  (1  )uC1),U k = R(1 + n)uC2 and Uk =  (1 + n)
2 uC1.U s i n g
the above partial derivatives and rewriting ˜ Ki where i  (fg,h) in terms of  (·),w eg e tt h e
GEEs as a weighted combination of intergenerational wedges:






























de and the ﬁrst best wedges x with
x { s,,e} are deﬁned as   uC2uC1, s  uC1RuC
2 and e  He











Proof of Proposition (2). Let us guess as equilibrium policy functions for the Benevolent
























which are structurally equivalent to the equilibrium policy rules in the political case. If Eq.
(16B) and (17B) are the equilibrium of the Gvt problem, then they must satisfy simultaneously
the GEEs given by conditions (12B) and (13B).L e t u s m a n i p u l a t e t h e GEEs,p l u g g i n gt h e











































0=uC2  uC1 (19B)
Using the equation of H (·), the following expressions result:
He =
h +( 1 )¯ h







h +( 1 )¯ h
(21B)
Under logarithmic utility and linear production function, plugging the guess given by Eq. (16B)
and (17B) into the saving function, we obtain the following recursive function for saving choice:




3 + R(1 + ))











3 + R(1 + )















3 + R(1 + )














1+h.F i n a l l yr e a r r a n g i n g









Using the political Euler condition uC2  uC1 =0and the economic one uC1  RuC
2 =0 ,



















2 h +( 1 )¯ h
1+n
(25B)




1 (g)h + a
g







1+ng,i . e .w eg u e s st h ep o l i c ye as a linear convex
combination between parental human capital h and human capital society endowment ¯ h scaled





















.P l u g g i n gt h eg u e s so feg given by Eq. (26B) into
the expression of ˜ 
g










By ﬁxed-point condition ˜ 
g















Similar arguments as in Proof of Theorem 1 can be made. Then let us consider the sta-



















1+n are the solutions for the guess on e which turns out to be equiv-
alent to the political outcome After plugging the guesses, Eq. (16B) and Eq. (17B),a n dt h e
recursive saving function, Eq. (22B),i n t oE q .(19B),t h eG E Ef o rt h ep o l i c y is as follows:

1
(1 + n)Rk +( 1+n)(1 + h)  (1 + n)2eg = 
1
(1 + h)(1  )  (1 + n) ˜ K (eg,,h)
(29B)
After some algebraic manipulations we obtain the following well-deﬁned system:

               













































































































1 = ¯ h1

R
































3 = R, b
g1
1 =( 1 )¯ h, b
g1
2 =  and b
g1
0 =0 .





which implies  = 1




O to be strictly greater than zero, is required. Consequently the Eq. (31B) is
not feasible.
Proof of Proposition (3). Let us ﬁrst consider the following normalization of the relative











   (1 + n)
+(1+n)
(32B)
Using the weights (32B) and comparing the parameters of the policy rules of Eq. (21) and Eq.



































Then we conclude T (ht,k t) >Tg (ht,k t) for any (ht,k t)  Pol Gvt.
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